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Letter dated 14 January 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Afghanistan addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the first report of the Monitoring Group on Afghanistan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1363 (2001). The Committee considered the report at its 9th meeting, held on 14 January 2002, and recommended its submission to the Security Council in view of the measures currently under discussion with regard to paragraph 23 of Security Council resolution 1333 (2000).

(*Signed*) Alfonso **Valdivieso**
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Afghanistan

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Annex

First Report of the Monitoring Group on Afghanistan Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1363 (2001)

Executive Summary

In paragraph 5 of its resolution 1363 (2001) the Security Council requested that the Monitoring Group report to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) regarding the work of the monitoring mechanism established by resolution 1363 (2001). The mechanism was tasked to monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000); and to collate, assess, verify wherever possible, report and make recommendations on information regarding violations of the measures imposed.

The events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent actions taken by the international coalition of nations against the Taliban regime and Al-Qaida have changed the situation significantly with respect to Security Council Resolution 1363 and requirements stipulated in Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1333. Given the coalition's activity against the Taliban and Al-Qaida it has not been possible to proceed with the deployment of the Sanctions Enforcement Support Team (SEST). Meanwhile, in the short time that they have been together, the members of the Monitoring Group have made significant strides towards fulfilling their mandate.

The Monitoring Group considers that the Taliban and remnants of Al-Qaida are likely to remain a potential threat to the peace process in Afghanistan and in the region for some considerable time to come. Based upon its assessment the Group recommends that the weapons embargo be maintained against the Taliban, Al-Qaida and their sympathizers.

Additionally, the Security Council may also wish to consider an arms embargo for the whole of Afghanistan. The modalities for monitoring and enforcing such an arrangement would need to be worked out.

The Monitoring Group recommends that the freezing of funds and other financial assets of individuals, entities related or associated with the Taliban, Al-Qaida and Usama Bin Laden as defined in resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) be maintained and monitored for compliance.

The Group recommends that as soon as the situation on the ground permits, a process of verification of all known terrorist training facilities be undertaken by the monitoring component of the Mechanism.

It is the view of the Monitoring Group that the closure of production facilities and storage sites for illicit drugs be internationally verified.

The Group also recommends that the monitoring component of the Mechanism be maintained. It is proposed that it be renamed to Monitoring and Advisory Teams (MAAT).

The Monitoring Group suggests that an effective border control service, including customs and immigration, need to be implemented by the Afghan authorities, as a matter of priority.

I. Introduction and Background

1. Security Council Resolution 1363 (2001) established a mechanism "...to monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000); and "...to collate, assess, verify wherever possible, report and make recommendations on information regarding violations of the measures imposed by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000);"[1]

2. The Security Council decided that the mechanism be comprised of :

(a) "...a Monitoring Group in New York of up to five experts, including a Chairman, to monitor the implementation of all the measures imposed by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000), including in the fields of arms embargoes, counter-terrorism and related legislation, and in view of the link to the purchase of arms and financing of terrorism, money laundering, financial transactions and drug trafficking; and..."

(b) "... a Sanctions Enforcement Support Team, under the coordination of the Monitoring Group...to be located in the states bordering Afghanistan...".

3. The Monitoring Group was accordingly appointed by the Secretary-General and commenced its work during October 2001. The Group consists of: Mr. Michael Chandler (United Kingdom), Chairman, Mr. Hasan Ali Abaza (Jordan), Mr. Philippe Graver (France), Mr. Michael Langan (United States of America) and Mr. Surendra Shah (Nepal).

4. This report highlights the progress made to date by the Monitoring Group on Afghanistan concerning the implementation of its mandate under SCR 1363 (2001) and makes recommendations as to the areas on which the Group should concentrate in the future.

5. Circumstances since the passing of the Resolution have greatly affected the Monitoring Group's approach to the work. The events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent actions taken by the international coalition of nations against the Taliban regime and Al-Qaida have changed the situation significantly with respect to resolution 1363 (2001) and requirements stipulated in resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000). Given the coalition's activity against the Taliban and Al-Qaida it has not been possible to proceed with the deployment of the Sanctions Enforcement Support Team (SEST). Notwithstanding this drawback, the Group has made considerable progress in the short time it has been together.

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[1] SCR 1267 (1999) required the cessation of sanctuary and terrorist training within Afghanistan, the handing over of Usama bin Laden by the Taliban, aviation restrictions on the Taliban and the freezing of overseas funds and other financial resources of the Taliban. SCR 1333 (2000) reasserted the principle of no sanctuary for terrorist training, the closure of terrorist camps, the handing over of Usama bin Laden, a ban on the sale or supply of arms or materiel to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, the elimination of all illicit drugs, additional aviation restrictions on the Taliban, and the freezing of funds of bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network.

II. Methodology

6. Comprehensive, accurate information is crucial to the work of the Monitoring Group. In this respect the Group is building a number of databases, relevant to its mandate, and also has undertaken a series of visits to agencies and organisations based in Europe with which it has established close working links and an effective exchange of information. These included the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP), the *Wassenaar* Arrangement Secretariat, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INTERPOL, the World Customs Organisation (WCO), and EUROPOL. In addition, meetings were held with government representatives of certain Member States and individuals, identified by the Group, who were able to provide important background material.

7. At the United Nations Headquarters in New York, the Monitoring Group met with the Permanent Representatives of Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to discuss offers of assistance which might be helpful to those countries in fulfilling their obligations relative to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000) and 1363 (2001).

III. Findings of the Monitoring Group

A. General observations

8. For the purposes of the arms embargoes and terrorist training facilities, Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000), refer to "…. the territory of Afghanistan under Taliban control…" This meant the approximate 90% of Afghanistan deemed to have been under the control of the Taliban regime until the international coalition offensive started. At the time of closing this report, the Taliban no longer hold any significant portion of Afghanistan. A specific leadership may have been compromised, but the impulse by external forces to influence the thinking of segments of Afghanistan's population, is a major concern to the Monitoring Group.

9. The number of former Taliban within Afghanistan was variably defined. Before the events of 11 September 2001, estimates ranged from 30,000 to 50,000 Taliban troops or militia including foreign fighters (or Afghan-Arabs, i.e. members of Al-Qaida). Since then, many of the Taliban who are indigenous Afghans or Pashtuns from the Pakistan provinces bordering Afghanistan have 'melted' back into the countryside. A number of instances of banditry and highway robbery have been reported, particularly in the areas from where the Taliban derived their support.

10. Consequently, the possibility cannot be ignored that the Taliban and their supporters still possess the means to stage an uprising. Past experience of post-conflict situations has shown the readiness of warring factions to use periods of a truce to re-arm and replenish stockpiles of ammunition, ready to revert to an armed struggle to settle their grievances in the event that they perceive the political settlement not to their liking. The Group considers that support for the Taliban regime still exists in many places. Due to the strength of this support, the Taliban and Al-Qaida are likely to remain a threat for some time to come.

11. Similarly, the Group is concerned with the continued presence, inside Afghanistan, of other terrorist groups, such as the Islamic Movement for Uzbekistan (IMU), Chechnyan guerrillas

and Muslim secessionists or Uygurs from the Western Chinese province of Xinjiang. Although the Monitoring Group is aware that some members of these groups were in Kunduz when it fell to the Northern Alliance and were observed as prisoners in Mazar-e-Sharif, their current whereabouts requires to be verified and recorded.

12. During meetings with some international law enforcement agencies, it became evident that information, which the Group requires to fulfil its mandate, is not available or could not be divulged by some of the agencies with whom the Group consulted. Linkages between the Taliban, Al-Qaida and organized crime networks, for example, are commonly agreed to exist but were not elaborated upon by those law enforcement agencies visited. The Group is looking into possible ways to ensure that such information can be released to it in a viable form.

13. Indeed, the Group considers that the sharing of information between elements of the international law enforcement community concerning the Taliban, Al-Qaida and organized crime must be improved. The ability of terrorists to network internationally – by linking each others' cells, through the movement of funds and people and with detailed planning – requires a reorientation and rethinking by international law enforcement agencies on how they will respond. It is of utmost importance that intelligence and police services worldwide cooperate to a far greater degree in pursuing international terrorist threats. Failure to rectify the international law enforcement community's possessive attitude towards crucial information could have adverse consequences for achieving counter-terrorist objectives.

14. The Group is taking the necessary steps to improve its working arrangements with the various international law enforcement agencies. For example, the Group is looking into the possibility of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Europol and the United Nations, similar to the one that already exists with Interpol.

B. Enforcing the Arms Embargo

15. The Monitoring Group considers that the single gravest threat to the Interim Administration and to lasting peace in Afghanistan is the unregulated and uncontrolled flow of weapons and military supplies to the different factions within Afghanistan.

16. The enclosure on Afghan Weaponry (attached to this report), compiled by the Monitoring Group, underlines the fact that, according to information from competent sources, the Taliban could possibly possess surface-to-surface missiles, such as ***Scud B17*** and ***Frog 7***. The ranges of the missiles are 280 – 300 kilometres for the ***Scud B17*** and 70 kilometres for the ***Frog 7***. These missiles may be fitted with conventional, chemical or nuclear warheads. At the moment, it is not knows whether these missiles are operational, or, where they are located. The latest information available to the Group is that, prior to the coalition offensive, there were c.100 ***Scud*** missiles and at least four ***Scud*** mobile launch units (type ***TEL***) in Afghanistan. The Group is attempting to determine 'the distribution' of these systems between the various factions in Afghanistan.

17. It has also been reported that the Taliban possess stockpiles of chemical shells, ***Sarin*** and ***VX*** gas projectiles, which could be fired by the M46 130 mm gun. The Monitoring Group has not been able to verify the locations or quantities of these weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

18. The Monitoring Group is concerned that Al-Qaida, the Taliban or their sympathizers could well use these missiles to deliver WMD in future attacks including against the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Consequently these weapons systems should be located, monitored and their operational status verified.

19. Following coalition activities in Afghanistan, evidence has come to light of Al-Qaida's interest in the manufacture of WMD, however crude some of them may appear. The intentions of radical terrorist groups linked to Al-Qaida could be highlighted by the recent activities of members of militant groups such as the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM).

20. Additionally, the task of determining the provenance of weapons is made more complicated due to the number of countries in which similar models are manufactured. It is quite difficult to distinguish a piece of Taliban military equipment from one used by the Northern Alliance. For instance, one of the most famous and versatile artillery pieces is the 122 mm howitzer D-30. More than 10,000 of these howitzers have been produced and fielded in no less than 65 countries. Although of Russian origin, they have been produced under license by eight countries.

21. Various United Nations panels have already recommended measures to be taken by Member States to implement effective controls to combat the illegal trafficking in weapons (import, transit, export) that might take place in their territory. Therefore, an effective arms embargo would not be possible without maximum cooperation of the countries bordering Afghanistan and those from which cargo flights are known to have taken place, carrying arms and ammunition in breach of United Nations sanctions. [2]

22. The Monitoring Group is concerned that certain individuals, including Victor Bout, referred to in other United Nations reports, could have been involved or may be tempted in the future to become involved, in the illegal supply of arms and ammunition to the Taliban, their sympathisers and elements of Al-Qaida. The Group has reliable information on that which it is in the process of evaluating. This task could be expedited with the presence of monitors on the ground.

23. Therefore, the Group considers that a clear requirement still exists for the deployment of the monitoring component of the Mechanism, which is also able to assist the Members States bordering Afghanistan to implement the appropriate measures and to verify and report on the effectiveness of these measures.

C. Drug Trafficking

24. The production of and trafficking in heroin and opiates continues to be a source of funds for the Taliban and Al-Qaida, who make use of internationally organized crime networks as they move drugs from Afghanistan to markets in Europe. In return, they acquire cash, or its equivalent, e.g., diamonds, military equipment and small arms, to continue their struggle. In many cases it is the same groups of individuals who are involved in all these illegal activities.

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[2] Chapter 7, Design and Implementation of Arms Embargos and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions – Results of the Bonn-Berlin Process, BICC. Bonn 2001.

25. It is no secret that the production of illicit drugs, their trafficking and drug addiction are widespread in the Central Asian region. The Group took note of a number of positive steps which have been taken to strengthen controls in the region against the illicit production and trafficking in drugs, in particular opiates, but also noted that much more effort and funding is required. The "Six Plus Two" group, China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, plus the Russian Federation and the USA, established a Working Group in September 2000, which "...with UNDCP assistance, elaborated and approved a Regional Action Plan for countering the Afghan drug threat."

26. The September 2001 Report of the UNODCCP summarises the reasons for the transhipment of drugs through Central Asia. The region is the natural transit zone between Afghanistan and Eastern and Western Europe. The risk level of moving drugs across certain parts of Afghanistan's border is low, due to poor controls in neighbouring states and the inability to make comprehensive interdiction efforts. For example, the implementation of strengthened control measures by Iran has forced the drug traffickers to use alternative routes, which can be described as 'softer', in order to avoid detection.[3]

27. The Report indicates that "... large amounts of opium, heroin and hashish of Afghan origin are trafficked into Central Asia mainly via Tajikistan, as well as across Uzbekistan's borders with Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan's very extensive frontiers both with Afghanistan and Iran...". Notwithstanding the ban on poppy cultivation, imposed by the Taliban regime in the year 2000, there have been suggestions that considerable quantities of opium were stockpiled in Afghanistan. Recent reports of the movement of opiates into the countries bordering Afghanistan, particularly in recent weeks, lend cr' 'ibility to these earlier assumptions. It is also believed that many of the stockpiles of opium ¿ .n and heroin, which existed in "...Taliban controlled areas of Afghanistan..." have been moved closer to the 'soft' borders or immediately outside Afghanistan itself.

28. In addition, there have been reports that a considerable number of 'laboratories' are known to have been operating inside Afghanistan. These require to be identified, closed down and certified as such.

29. During its visit to the WCO, the Group received a number of encouraging suggestions. The WCO publishes a detailed annual Customs and Drugs Report which is intended for the use of its members and law enforcement agencies. Seizures of illicit drugs, precursor chemicals and cash are reported to the WCO and disseminated in this global overview that stresses international partnership as a key to the enforcement of effective controls against illegal drugs trafficking. The Group considers that close cooperation with the WCO in respect to the support required by the countries bordering Afghanistan would be beneficial, particularly in view of the role played by national customs and other border security services in the fight against organized crime.

30. The Group has been briefed and received a number of favourable reports on "Operation Topaz", concerning the impact of stricter international controls implemented by drug control and

[3] UN International Drug Control Programme Current/Planned Activities in Central Asia Illicit Drugs Situation in Central Asia and UNDCP Response, September 2001, p.1

law enforcement agencies throughout Europe and Asia. These reports indicate an increase in seizures of precursor chemicals, particularly acetic anhydride.

31. Meanwhile, information received by the Group indicates a return to poppy cultivation as Afghan farmers look to crops which can realise a rapid "cash return" in the post-conflict environment. This raises the spectre of additional funds again being available to the Taliban, Al-Qaida and their sympathisers. In order to negate this concern, the international community must fulfil its promise of support for the development of substitute crops in Afghanistan. In addition, the Interim Administration should be encouraged to implement a ban on poppy cultivation throughout the country, in keeping with paragraph 6, Annex III of the Bonn Agreement. [4]

D. Financial Assets Seizures

32. Although the Taliban and Al-Qaida networks undoubtedly benefited (and may still be,) from the proceeds of the opium and heroin trade, the bulk of their financing has come from a variety of sources and from many countries, through entities which support their terrorist ideology. The collection methods included excising funds from wealthy individuals, legitimate businesses, charities, religious centres and profits from cooperative enterprises with organized crime.

33. In addition the Taliban also derived a considerable amount of their 'income' by making improper use of the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA).[5] Besides providing the ideal cover for smuggling high value goods into Afghanistan, which then found their way illegally into the neighbouring countries, in particular Pakistan, the ATTA also facilitated the movement of arms and ammunition into, and drugs out-of, Afghanistan. Consequently, the Monitoring Group considers that, should the ATTA be re-introduced, its terms and conditions require to be revised to ensure the inclusion of controls that are effective and that can be monitored.

34. Following the visit to UNODCCP, the Group has been provided with access to the anti-Money Laundering Information Database (AMLID) which is part of the UNODCCP Global Programme Against Money Laundering. The Group has also learnt that Interpol has reached an agreement with the United States to create a database that will provide law enforcement agencies around the world with quick access to information for the crackdown on terrorist financial networks. Interpol members will be expected to provide information on any accounts in their jurisdictions linked to the names in the database. This information will likewise become available in global plans to track terrorist funds.

35. The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Afghanistan issued a consolidated list on 26 November 2001 containing the names of individuals and entities whose funds and other financial resources should be frozen, as designated by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000). An Addendum to the list was issued on 26 December 2001. Member States were requested to provide the Committee with information

[4] Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, 5 December 2001.

[5] In 1950 Pakistan gave Afghanistan permission to import duty-free goods through the port of Karachi. The Agreement was expanded in the 1980's.

regarding additional measures adopted or requests for additions or deletions of names from the list. The Group has been advised, informally, that compliance with the measures, in a number of cases, has being less than adequate. The Group is developing a plan of action by which to investigate these allegations and promote better compliance.

E. Terrorist Training Facilities

36. The Group has obtained information from a variety of sources concerning the location of at least 100 terrorist training facilities, as known prior to the coalition action in Afghanistan. It should be noted that numbers depend on varying definitions of "a training facility", some being simple camps from which to conduct basic military training and others comprised of extensive storage and support facilities. At the time of writing, the Group has been unable to confirm the accuracy and the totality of this information. However, the Group considers that, in order for it to complete its task, in particular with respect to resolution 1363 (2001), a process of monitoring and verification of all the known terrorist training facilities should be undertaken as soon as the situation on the ground in Afghanistan permits. Regrettably, other training facilities, established to support Al-Qaida and the Taliban are not confined to the borders of Afghanistan.

IV. Conclusions

37. The Taliban, remnants of Al-Qaida, their many sympathisers and other terrorist groups that had been fighting in Afghanistan are likely to remain a potential threat to the peace process in Afghanistan and in the region for some considerable time to come.

38. The flow of arms into, within and from Afghanistan has always been seen as long-term cause of insecurity and instability in the Central Asian region. In addition, the existence of WMD and potential means for their delivery require to be verified and brought under control. Therefore, effective arms control measures need to be implemented by the countries bordering Afghanistan, reinforced and monitored at the regional and international levels, in order to confront this ongoing challenge to international peace and security.

39. It is important that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants be undertaken as soon as possible.

40. Despite the efforts of UNODCCP within Afghanistan and the bordering states, drug production and trafficking continue to be major problems. Structural, financial and institution-building support, as recommended by the UNDCP, must be forthcoming immediately to cope with this overwhelming and society-destroying threat. The cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs must be combated by the Interim Administration, in conjunction with countries in the region, the United Nations and other appropriate institutions.

41. 'Terror money' - using financial crimes, that include money laundering, for Al-Qaida and Usama bin Laden - can be traced and its effectiveness diminished by means of international cooperation that begins on the local level. The majority of the Member States, which are of particular interest to the Monitoring Group, have responded to the demands of the Security Council contained in the resolutions 1267(1999) and 1333 (2000) with respect to the freezing of

financial assets. However, there appear to be some gaps in the depths of compliance which the Group has not so far been able to substantiate.

42. Should it be deemed appropriate to re-instate the ATTA, the Agreement should be revised so that it cannot be abused thus providing financial benefit to factions, fiefdoms and individuals at the expense of the recognised governments.

43. Despite the reported coalition action against terrorist training facilities in Afghanistan, the scope of damage inflicted and the general status of these facilities remain unknown to the Group. Therefore, the Group considers, that until their status can be fully verified, the presence of these facilities may, if reused by factions at odds with the Interim Administration, continue to present a threat to peace and security, not only to Afghanistan, but also to the region as a whole.

44. Afghanistan's borders must be controlled from within and without the country. Responsibility for the internal control of Afghanistan's borders rests with the governmental authorities of Afghanistan. In the current circumstances this will be difficult to achieve given that the necessary components, e.g. customs, and immigration services, have not yet been effectively established. Consequently, the onus for effective border controls is likely to fall heavily on Afghanistan's neighbours for the foreseeable future.

45. It appears to the Group that reservations, with regard to the exchange of crucial information concerning the Taliban, Al-Qaida, their sympathisers and organised crime, still exist between international law enforcement agencies, despite the events of 11 September. For example, detailed information about the results of investigations and the legal action taken, subsequent to known seizures was not forthcoming. The Monitoring Group considers that better cooperation and coordination concerning the exchange of crucial information will enhance the fight against international terrorism.

V. Recommendations

46. The Group recommends that the weapons embargo be maintained against the Taliban, Al-Qaida and their sympathizers.

47. Additionally, to avoid proliferation of weapons, the Security Council may also wish to consider an arms embargo (or a moratorium on weapons) for the whole of Afghanistan. Exceptions supported by the United Nations for the supply of arms and ammunition would be made for those forces under the command of the Ministry of Defence of the Interim Administration engaged in operations against the Taliban and Al-Qaida and charged with the maintenance of public security and law and order throughout Afghanistan. The modalities for monitoring and enforcing such an arrangement will need to be worked out.

48. It is recommended that a programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants be undertaken as soon as possible in parallel with the restructuring of the armed and security forces in Afghanistan.

49. The Monitoring Group recommends that an effective border control service, including customs and immigration, be implemented by the Afghan authorities, as a matter of priority.

50. The requirement for a monitoring component of the Mechanism still exists. Accordingly, the Group recommends that the name, Sanctions Enforcement-Support Team (SEST), be changed to Monitoring and Advisory Teams (MAAT). In addition the Group recommends that some of the people assigned to the MAAT possess different skills and experience from those originally envisaged for the SEST, as specified under the terms of resolution 1363 (2001).

51. It is essential that the closure of former drug production facilities – and storage sites for illicit drugs – within Afghanistan be internationally verified. This activity could be undertaken by members of the MAAT in close cooperation with existing entities dealing with the issue.

52. The Interim Administration and their successors must be encouraged to impose a ban on the cultivation of opium poppies throughout Afghanistan, backed by the widespread introduction of substitute crops. This latter programme will require technical and financial support from the international community.

53. It is recommended that the freezing of funds and other financial assets of individuals, entities related or associated with the Taliban, Al-Qaida and Usama Bin Laden as defined in resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) be maintained and monitored for full compliance.

54. The Group strongly recommends that some members of the MAAT have skills and experience in financial investigations. This will enable them to offer assistance to national governments and central bank authorities on improving their legal frameworks, compliance initiatives and enforcement mechanisms.[6]

54. Terrorist training facilities and camps in Afghanistan must be verified as inoperable. For the foreseeable future all such facilities require to be identified, their status verified and monitored for closure, to assure compliance with relevant resolutions. This will require the deployment of monitoring teams to Afghanistan.

[6] pp. x-xii, Targeted Financial Sanctions A Manual For Design And Implementation Contributions From The Interlaken Process, The Swiss Confederation in cooperation with the United Nations Secretariat and the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University. 2000

Enclosure

Afghan Weaponry

Table of military hardware of the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, as of September 2001.

Main Battle Tank	T-54/-55 T-62/-64	250 - 300	T-54/-55 T-62/-64	Less than 200
Armoured Vehicles	Various types	Around 300	Various types	Around 150
Artillery	Various types	600 - 800	Various types	Less than 500
Multiple Launch Rocket Systems	Various types	Less than 100	Various types	Around 80
Ground to Ground Missiles	R-17 Scud B R-70 Frog 7	Unknown Unknown	R-17 Scud B R-70 Frog 7	25-30 Around 10
Air Defence Systems	SA-7 Grail SA-13 Gopher FIM-92A-Stinger Blowpipe	Unknown Unknown Unknown	SA-7 Grail SA-13 Gopher FIM-92A-Stinger	Unknown Unknown Unknown
Antitank Guided Weapons	Milan	Unknown	Milan 9M 11 Fagot	Unknown About 10
Combat Aircraft	MIG 17/21 Sukhoi 17/20/22	20 - 30	MIG 17/21 Sukhoi17/20/22	Around 10 None
Training Aircraft	L-39C Albatros	4	None	None
Transport Aircraft	Antonov 12/24/26/32	16	Antonov 12/24/26/32	About 10
Attack Helicopters	MI-24 Hind	10	MI-24 Hind	2
Transport Helicopters	MI-8/-17 Hip	About 40	MI-8/-17 Hip	Less than 10

Source: Various sources as compiled by the Monitoring Group.

After the Soviet Armed Forces had left Afghanistan in 1991, the military hardware possessed either by the Afghan armed forces or the Mujahideen appeared to be as follows:

Afghan armed forces:
(Afghan communist forces as known at the time of the withdrawal of the Soviet Armed Forces.)

Tanks	1568
Armoured infantry fighting and transport vehicles	828
Artillery pieces	4880

Combat aircraft	126
Combat helicopters	14
Scud missiles	12
Frog 7 missiles	10

Mujahideen forces:

Tanks	97
Armoured infantry fighting and transport vehicles	160
Anti-aircraft heavy machine guns	5000
Mortars	3500
Recoilless rifles	2000
Antitank weapons	11000

Source: Various sources as compiled by the Monitoring Group.